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Police and National Security: American Local Law
Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11
Matthew C. Waxman

*

INTRODUCTION
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks inside the United States,
local police agencies have taken on greater national security roles and
responsibilities. “The September 11 attacks,” wrote Attorney General John
Ashcroft to all U.S. Attorneys in November 2001, “demonstrate that the
war on terrorism must be fought and won at home as well as abroad”:
To meet this new threat and to prevent future attacks,
law enforcement officials at all levels of government –
federal, state, and local – must work together, sharing
information and resources needed both to arrest and
prosecute the individuals responsible and to detect and
1
destroy terrorist cells before they can strike again.
President Obama’s Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano,
recently testified that the budget request from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) included additional counterterrorism funding for “systems
to enhance information-sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal law
2
enforcement.” Elsewhere Napolitano characterized partnerships with state,
local, and tribal authorities as one of the priorities of the DHS and noted
that “[p]artnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies affect
DHS’s ability to identify threats and bolster preparedness before an
incident,” and that “[i]nformation sharing between DHS and state and local
3
governments is particularly critical to our security.”

* Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Member of the Hoover Institution
Task Force on National Security and Law; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign
Relations. I thank the following individuals for their helpful comments: William C. Banks,
David Bayley, Ben Bowling, David Cole, Jeffrey Fagan, Aziz Huq, Debra Livingston,
Samuel Rascoff, Daniel Richman, Jacqueline Ross, and Peter Schuck.
1. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys, Cooperation
with State and Local Officials in the Fight Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/agdirective5.pdf.
2. FY 2010 Budget Request: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th
Cong. (2009) (oral testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dept. of Homeland Sec.),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1242307132502.shtm.
3. The Path Forward: Hearing on DHS Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dept. of Homeland Sec.),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1235577134817.shtm.
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This article examines three national security law challenges resulting
from greater involvement of state and local police agencies in protecting
national security, especially in combating terrorism: organizational
challenges, accountability challenges, and institutional tensions with
traditional local police functions. Each threatens the balance of security
and civil liberties.
This article concludes by forecasting that these three challenges will be
addressed incrementally over time, depending on such factors as the
continuing evolution of the terrorism threat. Aside from its specific
observations, a broader point of this article is that the overwhelming
scholarly attention focused on federal national security law issues misses
the practical consequences of legal debates that often play out at a local
level in very different ways.
Part II examines organizational challenges, in particular how the
decentralized and localized nature of American policing creates enormous
problems in coordinating national security and counterterrorism activities.
Local police agencies offer tremendous resources in terms of personnel and
the familiarity needed to prevent, investigate, and respond to terrorism. But
the atomization of U.S. policing requires new coordination mechanisms to
harness these resources effectively in pursuit of a national agenda. In recent
years the federal government and the states have launched many initiatives
aimed at integrating the thousands of U.S. law enforcement agencies, which
vary widely in size, capability, threat perception, and relationship to local
communities.
Part III examines accountability challenges, including secrecy issues
and how the counterterrorism agenda may influence or disrupt systems of
political accountability of local police agencies. Those systems are
designed for traditional police functions like preventing crime and
maintaining order, the costs and benefits of which are generally felt locally
and discerned visibly by the public. By contrast, some national security
functions are necessarily shielded from public view, and the benefits of
local police efforts in support of national security accrue elsewhere or are
unobservable.
Part IV examines functional challenges, especially how some of the
attributes that make local policing a useful counterterrorism tool also create
difficulties in simultaneously carrying out more traditional functions. A
tension that sometimes exists between law enforcement and intelligence
activities is exacerbated when stretched across local-federal lines, and some
actions that may be important to national security can be highly disruptive
to traditional law and order police efforts within local communities.
Finally, Part V offers some general observations about alternative
futures and the opportunities for addressing the challenges outlined here.
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I. AMERICAN POLICING AND NATIONAL SECURITY
BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
The subject of police and national security in the United States often
conjures fears of aggressive snooping and overbroad sweeps of political
dissidents. In the years following World War I, a period now remembered
for overblown alarm about radical leftist activity, J. Edgar Hoover’s Bureau
of Investigation (the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or
FBI) enlisted local police agencies to conduct a series of raids – called the
“Palmer Raids” for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer – on suspected
4
radicals. On two occasions – in November 1919 and January 1920 – the
government violently seized thousands of immigrants across the United
States without arrest warrants and targeted them for deportation based on
suspicion that they held radical political beliefs.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI requested local police agencies’
assistance in its “Counter-Intelligence Program” (COINTELPRO), aimed at
allegedly subversive political groups, eventually including wide swaths of
5
the civil rights movement membership.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, local police again
mobilized in support of nationwide efforts to combat national security
threats, this time jihadist terrorism. Some observers see this as a necessary
6
precaution; others see parallels to past law enforcement abuses. Both
views were displayed, for instance, when the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) prepared for the 2004 Republican National
Convention by deploying undercover officers across the country to conduct
covert surveillance of suspected protesters, including members of religious
groups and anti-war organizations.
David Cohen, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and now Deputy New York City Policy Commissioner for
Intelligence, proclaimed that “[g]iven the range of activities that may be
engaged in by the members of a sleeper cell in the long period of
4. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 220-226 (2004). For a discussion of the
violent nature of the government raids, see CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER
RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 1-4
(2007) (“During the first raid in November 1919, the police arrested over 1,000 people in
eleven cities, sometimes bursting into their homes and dragging them out of their beds
without explanation. Many of those who were ultimately detained were denied access to an
attorney and kept ignorant of the charges against them.” ; “Over 3,000 members of the
Communist and Communist Labor parties were seized during a second, even larger raid in
January 1920.”) .
5. See DAVID CUNNINGHAM, THERE’S SOMETHING HAPPENING HERE: THE NEW LEFT,
THE KLAN, AND FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (2004); see also RICHARD E. MORGAN,
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA (1980).
6. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 63 (2002).
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preparation for an act of terror, the entire resources of the NYPD must be
available to conduct investigations into political activity and intelligence7
related issues.” Civil liberties groups expressed outrage and brought suits
8
against the city alleging widespread rights abuses and political harassment.
This tension between civil liberties and state security measures lies at
the heart of national security law. By “national security law,” I mean
regulation of coercive government powers wielded to protect the state,
including against external military threats as well as internal efforts to
undermine government. While there are some particular features that
pertain to local policing, the substantive issue of balancing investigatory
and coercive state powers against rights and freedoms is certainly not
unique to local police, nor is it unique to U.S. policing.
What makes the issue of U.S. policing and national security so
interesting and complex is the decentralized and localized nature of most
9
law enforcement in this country. A recent National Research Council
study estimates that there are about 13,500 local police departments across
10
the country. Another source puts the number of state and local police
11
agencies closer to 19,000.
Sub-federal police agencies include state, county, city, or town, and
tribal organizations. These sub-federal agencies are responsible for the vast
bulk of crime fighting and community protection in this country, and they
are as heterogeneous and geographically dispersed as the local populations
they serve.
Terrorism was by no means a new problem for the United States in
2001, nor were state and local governments uninvolved in the
counterterrorism effort before then. The 1990s alone saw the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the series of
attacks by “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski.

7. Jim Dwyer, City Police Spied Broadly Before G.O.P. Convention, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2007, at A1.
8. See Diane Cardwell, Lawyers’ Group Sues City over Arrests of Protesters, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B3.
9. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 131-136 (1977); James Q. Wilson,
Criminal Justice, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION
475, 475 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008).
10. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING:
THE EVIDENCE 49 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004). The Department of Justice
recently provided the following numbers: 12,766 local police departments and 3,067
sheriffs’ offices. Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Local
Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004 at 1 (Carolyn C. Williams ed.) (2007), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/csllea04.htm.
11. James X. Dempsey, Overview of Current Criminal Justice Systems, in COMPUTERS,
FREEDOM AND PRIVACY 101 (2000), available at http://www.cdt.org/publications/overview
ofcjis.pdf.
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Many states in the 1990s enacted criminal statutes against terrorist
12
activity that mirror federal criminal laws. Until the September 11 attacks,
however, terrorism within the United States was not a priority issue at any
level of government. Terrorism fell largely within the jurisdiction of the
FBI, and even there it was generally of secondary importance to fighting
13
federal crimes such as white-collar and narcotics offenses.
Following the 1993 World Trade Center attack, FBI Director Louis
Freeh tried to reorient the Bureau’s priorities toward counterterrorism,
including through the creation of a counterterrorism division, but his efforts
failed to alter significantly the agency’s dominant focus on investigating
14
and solving other federal crimes.
Meanwhile, one survey in the mid-1990s found that less than 40
percent of state law enforcement agencies and only about half of local
police agencies had contingency plans for dealing with terrorist threats.
About 40 percent of municipalities reported never having had contact with
15
federal agencies regarding terrorism issues.
The September 2001 attacks, followed soon after by anthrax attacks in
the postal system, generated new urgency in counterterrorism efforts and
stimulated information-sharing throughout the U.S. government system.
Changed threat perceptions also resulted in major federal and state
bureaucratic restructuring.
At the federal level this mobilization included vastly increasing the
FBI’s emphasis on domestic counterterrorism through structural changes
16
and increasing the personnel dedicated to this mission. Congress created
the new Department of Homeland Security, which consolidated nearly two
dozen federal agencies and assumed responsibility for protecting U.S.
17
territory from terrorist attacks and responding to natural disasters. Perhaps
most controversially, even the Department of Defense expanded its efforts
to identify suspected terrorists and other threats within the United States,
18
until civil liberties objections prompted curtailment.
12. See Laura K. Donohue & Juliette N. Kayyem, Federalism and the Battle over
Counterterrorist Law: State Sovereignty, Criminal Law Enforcement, and National Security,
25 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1 (2002).
13. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 74 (2004).
14. See id. at 76-78.
15. KEVIN JACK RILEY & BRUCE R. HOFFMAN, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL PREPAREDNESS 26, 31 (1995).
16. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FBI: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1908-2008,
at 98-106, available at http://www.fbi.gov/book.htm; Progress Report on the
Reorganization and Refocus of the FBI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’ts. of
Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/mueller061803.htm.
17. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101, 116 Stat. 2142.
18. In 2002, the Counterintelligence Field Activity Office (CIFA) was created within
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At the local level, too, governments shifted emphasis to preventing and
19
preparing for potential terrorist attacks. It was not just the magnitude of
the perceived terrorist threat after September 11 that pushed the
counterterrorism agenda down to local levels of government, including to
within the police agencies; it was also the sense that major national
vulnerabilities once again existed at home, with threats materializing or
operating inside U.S. borders. The September 11 attacks left the
government at all levels – federal, state and local – worried about gaps in
their capabilities to piece together and neutralize terrorist plots. Many of
the “dots” comprising the September 11 plot sequence occurred within the
United States, including flight instruction by several of the eventual
hijackers and traffic violation stops of two of them by state police. Perhaps,
it followed, the attacks could have been averted with better systems and
policies to discern, analyze, and act on such “dots” throughout the country,
20
ultimately uncovering the plot.
The September 11 attacks also created a national sense of fear that al
Qaeda and its allies were in the process of unleashing a campaign of
additional attacks using “sleeper cells” embedded in American
21
communities, and awaiting orders or opportunities to strike. A number of
the Department of Defense to better coordinate the Pentagon’s efforts to combat foreign
intelligence services and terrorism groups inside the United States. The Talon database,
maintained in CIFA and begun in 2003, was designed to house intelligence reports about
possible threats to military bases within the United States, but was “expanded to include
reports by local law enforcement agencies and military security personnel about nonviolent
demonstrations and rallies.” Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Intelligence Chief Proposes Ending a
Database, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A18. Reports later surfaced that the database
included information about antiwar protests at churches, schools, and Quaker meeting halls.
Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Documents Hold Tips on Antiwar Activities, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A18; Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Is Expected To Close Intelligence
Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at A24; see also Walter Pincus, Protesters Found in
Database: ACLU Is Questioning Entries in Defense Dept. System, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,
2007, at A8. Defense officials stated that those operating the Talon database had
“misinterpreted their mandate” in collecting such information. See Lichtblau & Mazzetti,
supra. CIFA was also tied to “national security letters” issued by the Pentagon to American
banks for the purpose of obtaining information about terrorism suspects. Mark Mazzetti,
Cheney Defends Efforts To Obtain Financial Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A10.
The Department of Defense closed Talon in September 2007. Press Release, Dep’t of Def.,
DoD To Implement Interim Threat Reporting Procedures (Aug. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11251, and CIFA in August
2008. Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Activates Defense Counterintelligence and Human
Intelligence Center (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid=12106.
19. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POST 9-11 POLICING: THE
CRIME CONTROL-HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM 1 (2005); Patrick S. Roberts, Shifting
Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process, 22 REV.
POL’Y RES. 437 (2005); Karen Tumulty, But Will We Be Any Safer?, TIME, Dec. 2, 2002, at
42.
20. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 215-241, 416-418.
21. See Kevin Whitelaw & Mark Mazzetti, War in the Shadows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Nov. 11, 2002, at 48.
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alleged al Qaeda cells in the United States have been arrested and
prosecuted in the years since the September 11 attacks, including the
“Lackawanna 6” (a half-dozen Yemeni-Americans living near Buffalo,
22
New York, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda) and a
23
Miami-based group allegedly bent on destroying Chicago’s Sears Tower.
Most recently, federal agencies arrested and charged Najibullah Zazi, an
Afghan immigrant who allegedly trained in an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan
24
and planned to detonate bombs within the United States.
In retrospect, the sophistication and potential effectiveness of many of
the thwarted cells has been called into doubt, and the partial disruption of al
Qaeda’s leadership apparatus in Afghanistan and Pakistan has sewn doubt
as to whether al Qaeda still poses a major threat of attack inside the United
25
States. But the reduced worry of centrally commanded or supported al
Qaeda cells inside the United States has been replaced by additional
concerns about locally rooted, organizationally autonomous radical
extremists who might plan and carry out terrorist attacks in the name of a
26
broader al Qaeda-inspired agenda.
As a result of these emerging threats, local police agencies have played
27
These
a number of expanded counterterrorism roles in recent years.

22. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005).
23. Damien Cave & Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot To Blow up Sears Tower
as Part of Islamic Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A19.
24. See David Johnston & Scott Shane, Terror Case: 'Scary' Ingredients, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2009, at A1.
25. See discussion below in Part V. A recent U.S. intelligence assessment did not rule
out the possibility of major al Qaeda attacks inside the United States. DENNIS C. BLAIR,
ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 6 (2009), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/
blair.pdf (“We lack insight into specific details, timing, and intended targets of potential,
current US Homeland plots, although we assess al-Qa’ida continues to pursue plans for
Homeland attacks . . .”); Walter Pincus, Counterterrorism Official Urges Broader Approach
to Foreign Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2009, at A21; see also Johnston & Shane, supra
note 24, (“In recent years, foiled plots announced with fanfare in Washington have
sometimes involved unsophisticated people who seem hardly capable of organizing a major
attack.”).
26. See BLAIR, supra note 25, at 7:
[W]e remain concerned about the potential for homegrown extremists inspired by
al-Qa’ida’s militant ideology to plan attacks inside the United Sates, Europe and
elsewhere without operational direction from the group itself. In this regard, over
the next year we will remain focused on identifying any ties between US-based
individuals and extremist networks overseas. Though difficult to measure, the
spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that provide religious justification for attacks;
aggressive and violent anti-Western rhetoric; and signs that self-generating cells in
the US identify with Bin Ladin’s violent objectives all point to the likelihood that a
small but violent number of cells may develop here.
27. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration
Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3
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include criminal law enforcement, public protection, emergency response,
and intelligence gathering.
Most criminal prosecutions for crimes directly related to terrorism are
28
investigated and prosecuted at the federal level. Federal investigative and
prosecutorial capabilities are vast and sophisticated, while federal
antiterrorism statutes and the high profile of such crimes push the
prosecution of terrorism crimes at the federal rather than state and local
levels. However, local police agencies’ efforts to prevent and deter crime
also aim to establish an environment inhospitable to terrorism-related
29
activities – a role that many local forces have internalized since 2001.
Besides these law enforcement roles, local police agencies’
responsibilities for providing protection of possible target sites, public
education and awareness, and emergency response have grown
30
considerably. An extensive survey in 2002 by the U.S. Conference of
Mayors details the significant financial and personnel costs of these efforts
31
at the municipal level, especially within local police departments. A 2005
survey of state and local police agencies by the International Association of

(2006). A 2005 RAND survey of state and local law enforcement agencies found, not
surprisingly, that counterterrorism activities have tended to be concentrated especially in
larger police departments: “[T]he survey findings, which reflect heightened awareness
associated with the Oklahoma City and September 11 attacks, suggest that the ‘eyes and
ears’ capability is concentrated among the larger departments. These are the agencies
investing in training, response plans, coordination, and other preparedness measures.” K.
JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 27 (2005),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG394/.
28. See N.Y.U. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD (Karen J.
Greenberg ed., 2006), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRC
Complete.pdf.
29. See George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Policing Terrorism, Civic Bulletin
No. 43 (Manhattan Inst. Ctr. for Civic Innovation, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cb_43.htm; see also Michael P.
Downing, Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police Department’s
available at http://policechief
Convergence Strategy, POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 2009,
magazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=1729&issue_id=22009:
Policing must be a convergent strategy that fights crime and disorder while
creating hostile environments for terrorists.
The theme of convergence illustrates the coupling of local resources, namely
police, with the ability to recognize ordinary crimes that terrorists have been
known to commit in preparation for their operational attack: committing traffic
violations, obtaining fake identification papers, smuggling, human trafficking,
counterfeiting, committing piracy, drug trafficking, or participating in any other
criminal enterprise that intersects with terrorists’ needs. Local police serve as the
eyes and ears of communities; as such, they are best positioned to observe
behaviors that have a nexus to terrorism.
30. See Nomination Hearing for Napolitano Before the S. Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’yDesignate of the Dept. of Homeland Sec.), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
testimony/testimony_1232547062602.shtm; Harris, supra note 27, at 10-12.
31. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, THE COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY IN AMERICA’S CITIES:
A 192-CITY SURVEY (2002).
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Chiefs of Police further documents significant changes in operational
32
capacity, mission focus, and program resourcing.
Perhaps the most important as well as controversial national security
33
role for police, however, is intelligence collection. Following exposure of
abusive law enforcement surveillance tactics during the 1950s to 1970s,
many police agencies dismantled their intelligence collection units
34
altogether. After September 11, many of these agencies scrambled to
reconstitute or expand their intelligence units, though research data on the
35
extent of this transformation remains slim. “It was often the feeling at
local law enforcement prior to 9/11 that intelligence gathering was a
Federal responsibility,” noted Miami Police Chief John F. Timoney in 2006
congressional testimony. “[B]ut the events in Madrid and London and some
events recently here in the United States are highlights that local law
36
enforcement can have a very important role.”
Many police agencies
created intelligence analyst positions and assembled new units dedicated to
37
countering terrorism. The difficult organizational, accountability and
functional challenges this role creates for the nationwide policing system
are explored in the next three Parts.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES
Intelligence, investigation, deterrence, site protection, public education,
38
and emergency response are not new concerns for local police agencies.
Indeed, having long held responsibility for all of these functions to certain
degrees, local police were already well suited to perform these antiterrorism
activities. But harnessing police agencies for a national security agenda
creates difficult organizational challenges, magnified by the resilience of
U.S. policing’s decentralization and heterogeneity.

32. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19, at 23-32.
33. Of course, intelligence – including the use of informants, undercover officers, and
electronic surveillance – is part of routine police crime prevention as well. The line between
such activities and national security intelligence is not a bright one, though the latter may be
better hidden from public view and has proven more likely to intrude on political and
religious activities. See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic
Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493,
533, 566-568 (2007).
34. Edward R. Maguire & William R. King, Trends in the Policing Industry, 593
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (2004).
35. See id.
36. Police as First Preventers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of John F. Timoney, Chief of Police, Miami, Fla.)
37. See Maguire & King, supra note 34.
38. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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It is natural that local police agencies would be called upon to combat
the terrorism threat after September 11. The public looks first to local
police for basic security. Furthermore, the federal government had little
choice but to seek and cultivate the assistance of local police because these
agencies possess the numbers of personnel needed to sustain these functions
over vast territory and for long periods of time. According to recent data,
state and local law enforcement agencies employed about 730,000 full-time
39
sworn officers, defined as those with general arrest powers, compared with
40
the FBI’s roughly 13,000 special agents. The New York City Police
Department’s counterterrorism division alone (by far the largest municipal41
level counterterrorism force) has about 1,000 dedicated officers, while the
entire FBI dedicates only about one-and-a-half times that number of special
42
agents to combating terrorism.
Aside from this numerical advantage, local police are often believed to
be better suited to perform counterterrorism functions because of their
43
superior familiarity with their local communities. Whereas federal law
enforcement officials are tasked with investigating specific federal crimes,
local police functions include preventing and investigating crime as well as
maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services. As a result of these
wider mandates, local police are positioned naturally to collect and process
information about communities and activities within them.
Modern policing strategy trends, including community policing and
problem-oriented policing, also call for wide and deep engagement within
44
the community. These responses to crime, disorder, and other community
problems require fostering both proactive and reactive relationships with
local social agencies, civic leaders, and community organizations, as well
45
as developing deep awareness of community environments. Armed with

39. Reaves, supra note 10.
40. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Quick Facts, http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm.
See also Judith Miller, On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism, Summer 2007, CITY J.,
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_ preventing_terrorism.html (quoting Los
Angeles Police Department counterterrorism official who states: “The FBI has 12,000 agents
for the entire country, only some of whom do counterterrorism. Local and state law
enforcement includes some 800,000 people who know their territory. We are destined to be
frontline soldiers in what could be a very long and complicated war.”).
41. See Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD,
Prepared Statement of Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://hsgac.
senate.gov/public/_files/091206Falkenrath.pdf, at 3.
42. The FBI does not publish current figures on this, but in 2003 the number was
about 1600. See Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://www.9-11commission.
gov/hearings/hearing6/witness_macgaffin.htm.
43. See Marc Sageman, A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists, 618
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 223 (2008).
44. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
45. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 85-93; DAVID H. BAYLEY,
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such knowledge and networks of community relationships, local police can
better cultivate informants and detect suspicious irregularities.
While the decentralized structure of U.S. policing offers several
advantages when it comes to combating terrorism, it also creates
organizational challenges. To begin with, that local police agencies
command large numbers of personnel intimately familiar with their local
communities makes them a valuable asset for fulfilling counterterrorism
functions but creates an enormous complication in return. How should
these resources be coordinated across thousands of local agencies and with
the federal government?
Counterterrorism cooperation among police agencies requires
horizontal and vertical coordination. Horizontally, local police agencies
need to communicate and collaborate with other local police agencies.
Vertically, they need to communicate and collaborate with state and federal
agencies. Information must then flow along these axes. Information about
threats or investigative leads must radiate from the center (often through
federal agencies such as the FBI or Department of Homeland Security) out
to local agencies that can act on that information. Those local agencies at
the periphery must direct information toward the center, where it can be
acted upon immediately by the federal government or aggregated to help
46
shape policy.
Besides informational coordination, which needs to be achieved quickly
and often secretly, operations by law enforcement agencies (such as arrests
and surveillance) need to be coordinated across multidimensional
47
jurisdictional lines. The problem of how to link thousands of separate
agencies together efficiently is not simply one of scale. Heterogeneity also
magnifies the complexity.
Local police jurisdictions differ greatly in features such as population
size and density, ethnic composition, geography, urbanization, sitting of
48
high-profile targets, civic culture, and political orientation. Local police
forces vary in terms of size, resources, capability, operating procedures,
equipment, and day-to-day priorities, not to mention variations in local
49
laws, including those regulating police conduct.
In terms of size, for example, the 46 largest metropolitan police forces
(out of a total of over 13,000 state and local forces) account for over a third

POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 105-120 (1994).
46. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING 3 (2007),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html.
47. For a discussion of these issues in the context of the Zazi case, discussed supra
note 24 and in accompanying text, see Associated Press, NYPD Source’s Role Fuels
Questions About Raids, Sept. 22, 2009.
48. For a description of contrasting approaches to counterterrorism policing in New
York City and Los Angeles, see Miller, supra note 40.
49. See Shane Harris, Fusion Centers Raise a Fuss, NAT’L J.,(2007).
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of all police officers nationwide, while there are also nearly 800 local police
50
agencies that have just one officer. Consider also the unique threats that
New York City faces, for example, as a densely populated, ethnically
51
diverse home to much of the U.S. and global private financial system.
In countries with national police forces, such as France, the
organizational challenge of coordinating local counterterrorism police
52
efforts is eased through centralized and hierarchical command. Although
the United Kingdom does not have a single national police force, its local
police forces are linked to each other and to national counterterrorism
efforts through standardized institutional mechanisms. Each individual
police force in the United Kingdom, for example, until recently had a
special branch whose primary duties were to prosecute and assist in
counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations. Before recent reforms
53
further centralized British counterterrorism policing, these units interacted
directly with MI5 (the Security Service, which deals with domestic
intelligence) and MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service, which deals with
54
intelligence abroad).
The United States cannot rely on such formal hierarchical command or
uniform institutional mechanisms to link together the country’s massive
policing network. The Constitution was designed so that the federal
government may not directly control local law enforcement agencies. In
Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal
statutory provision that required local law enforcement officials to assist in
conducting background checks prior to issuance of gun permits. The case
clarifies that the federal government cannot “commandeer” local police
55
forces into service, which means that it must use other tools to align the
efforts of state and local police agencies with federal initiatives.
These tools include information-sharing arrangements, financial grants,
56
and training programs designed to help bolster and unify local capabilities.

50. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 49.
51. For a detailed discussion of how the New York Police Department organizes for
these counterterrorism challenges, see Prepared Statement of Testimony Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of
Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Comm’r for Counterterrorism, N.Y. Police Dept.), available
at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/091206Falkenrath.pdf; see also CHRISTOPHER
DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY: INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST COUNTERTERROR FORCE – THE NYPD
(2009).
52. See PETER CHALK & WILLIAM ROSENAU, CONFRONTING THE “ENEMY WITHIN”:
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE, THE POLICE, AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN FOUR DEMOCRACIES 1723 (2004)
53. Hugh Muir, End of the Road for Special Branch, GUARDIAN, Sept. 9, 2005,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/09/terrorism.ukcrime.
54. CHALK & ROSENAU, supra note 52, at 7-15.
55. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929, 933-935 (1997).
56. See Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Release of
Application Guidance for Over $3 Billion in Grant Programs, Feb. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1201882070387.shtm. The Department of Justice’s
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The U.S. policing system has dealt with similar challenges in confronting
other law enforcement issues, such as narcotics trafficking and gang or
organized crime activity, that have national and international dimensions,
and require information sharing and coordination among federal and local
57
police agencies. Counterterrorism, however, differs in size and
complexity.
The federal government has established several platforms for sharing
terrorism-related information among local police forces and between local
and federal agencies. The FBI has spearheaded the expansion over recent
years of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in local areas. Other federal,
state, and local agencies have assigned officers to the JTTFs to help
coordinate intelligence and law enforcement operations across bureaucratic
lines. In effect, the JTTFs allow the federal government to exert
considerable control over any operations that run through them. There were
about three dozen such FBI-led task forces before September 11, 2001,
58
compared with over 100 today. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, as amended in 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, requires
the President to take action to facilitate sharing of terrorism-related
59
information among federal, state, and local entities.
The Department of Homeland Security funds state-operated “fusion
centers” to synthesize law enforcement and investigative information.
Unlike the JTTFs, which help manage operations of participating agencies,
the fusion centers operate as information clearinghouses. Similarly, the
Justice Department has established new programs such as a National Data
Exchange, to enable federal law enforcement and intelligence officials to

State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT) is an example of a federal
training program. The program provides “pre-incident terrorism awareness training to state,
local, and tribal law enforcement” personnel. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Fact Sheet:
Supporting State and Local Government Law Enforcement Accomplishments 2001-2008,
Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2008/psc 08993.htm.
57. See Kip Schlegel, Transnational Crime: Implications for Local Law Enforcement,
16 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 365 (2000); TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 29 (Peter
Reuter & Carol Petrie eds., Committee on Law and Justice, National Research Center,
1999). As examples, the FBI manages Violent Gang Task Forces and the Drug Enforcement
Agency manages Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, while the federal
government has established information-sharing mechanisms among federal and local law
enforcement agencies for dealing with gun, immigration, and narcotics offenses, among
other types of crimes. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigations, Violent Gang Task
Forces, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/ngic/natgangfs.htm; Drug Enforcement
Agency, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm.
58. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2007),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf.
59. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-3670 (2004) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, §504, 121 Stat.
266, 313-17 (2007)).

390

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 3:377
60

examine quickly huge quantities of state and local public records. The FBI
recently launched a new system for sharing tips about possible terror threats
61
with local police agencies.
The idea behind these programs is to build “an information sharing
framework that supports an effective and efficient two-way flow of
information enabling officials at all levels of government to counter and
62
respond to threats.” The problem is not merely to collect and pass on
more informational “dots,” but to make sense of them in ways that can be
acted on effectively. Indeed, the more “dots” that are collected, the harder
it may be to analyze and prioritize them.
It remains to be seen how effective these information networking
efforts will be. They are not yet fully developed; technology continues to
change rapidly; and reliable data on their use are sparse. Some dangers are
evident already, however.
First, the expansion of an information-sharing network magnifies some
privacy risks, especially personal information collected in one locale is
63
distributed more widely and to other levels of government.
In some
jurisdictions, civil liberties advocates have complained about the lack of
adequate mechanisms to regulate government information-fusion activities,
64
and this has sometimes helped to prompt oversight reforms.

60. Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Ellen Nakashima, National Dragnet Is a Click Away,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2008, at A1. The National Data Exchange has been used since March
2008, but will not become fully operational and deployed until 2010. See Posting of Michael
Cooney to Layer 8 Blog, FBI Turns on National Crime Information Sharing System,
available at http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/27127.
61. See Devlin Barrett, FBI Shares Threat-Tips with Local Police Agencies,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 14, 2009; see also Eric Schmitt, Surveillance Effort Draws Civil
Liberties Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A12 (“A growing number of big-city
police departments and other law enforcement agencies across the country are embracing a
new system to report suspicious activities that official say could uncover terrorism plots but
that civil liberties groups contend might violate individual rights.”).
62. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 46. Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano recently
remarked: “Over time, [information-sharing] has proven easy to talk about and difficult to
act upon – but we must move forward on it if we are to strengthen our state and local
partnerships. The fusion of information between the federal, state and local levels is what
makes the intelligence-gathering process critically valuable to preventing threats from
materializing. Information sharing is also what makes response efforts effective. The
creation of a seamless network we can use to share this information among these levels of
government is a critical part of improving our partnerships.” The Path Forward, supra note
3.
63. See Barrett, supra note 61.
64. Jason Hancock, Iowa’s Intelligence Fusion Center ‘Connects the Dots,’ IOWA
INDEP., July 29, 2008, http://iowaindependent.com/2983/iowas-intelligence-fusion-centerconnects-the-dots; see also William Petroski, Intelligence Centers’ Growth Concerns Civil
Libertarians, DES MOINES REG., May 26, 2009, available at http://www.desmoinesregister.
com/article/20090526/NEWS10/905260381/-1/SPORTS09; Mary Beth Sheridan, States
Setting up Own Antiterror Centers: Privacy Issues Raised as Data Are Collected, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2007 available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/
2007/01/01/states_setting_up_own_antiterror_centers/?page=1.
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Information-sharing also carries security risks. For example,
information about threats or ongoing investigations that the federal
government hopes to keep quiet are more likely to surface publicly as more
65
agencies have access to that information. Indeed, political pressures on
local police, described below, may make them more likely than federal
police to broadcast or leak sensitive public safety information.
An efficient and effective network also requires some degree of
standardization across the thousands of police agencies at all levels. But
standardization itself is difficult to achieve when the police forces
themselves vary in size, capability, sophistication, and in the threats their
jurisdictions face, especially when the federal government lacks authority to
dictate reform at the local level.
Even if uniform approaches could be imposed by the federal
government through indirect means, too much standardization might
undermine the advantages of experimentation and tailoring to conditions
that come with local autonomy. Or, as the next section explores, excessive
standardization might disrupt systems of local accountability.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES
“It has long been accepted,” according to one major treatise on the
police powers of the state, “that the best way to maintain the accountability
of the police is to keep the lines between the local community and the
66
police department as short as possible.” “The main consequence of
America’s decentralized [criminal justice] system,” observes James Q.
Wilson, “is that public opinion closely watches and deeply influences law
67
enforcement.”
Maintaining police accountability through local public and political
control is relatively straightforward when local police are focused
exclusively on their traditional functions of preventing crime, maintaining
order, and providing services. Combating terrorism and other threats to the
nation with intrusive powers, however, exerts pulls on local policing that
strain these systems and patterns of political accountability.

65. See Theo Milonopoulos, Local Officials Ask for Help in Terrorism Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at 13 (describing federal security clearance procedures as a barrier to
greater federal, state, and local counterterrorism information-sharing).
On recent
intelligence information-collection reforms, see Press Release, ACLU, Intelligence
Community Raises Its Standards for Information Collection: Collaborative Effort Addresses
Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/general/39656prs20090522.html.
66. See JOHN D. BREWER ET AL., THE POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE STATE 115 (2d
ed. 1996).
67. Wilson, supra note 9, at 476. See generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (discussing the relationship between various
understandings of democracy and policing in the United States).
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Most police agencies are locally financed and controlled, and are
subject to direction and oversight by officials elected by and responsible to
68
the communities they serve. Many municipal police chiefs, for example,
are appointed by elected mayors. County sheriffs are often elected directly.
State governments may provide some financial and other resources to local
police agencies, but critical budgetary allocation decisions are made by
local governments themselves. Local police officers are generally drawn
from the community they will serve, and they are mostly trained there as
well.
These long-standing features of U.S. policing – reflecting historical
distrust of central government as well as some efficiency and practical
advantages – have made the system highly resistant to calls for
69
centralization or consolidation.
The notion that local police agencies are accountable to their own
communities and responsive to local needs and preferences has never meant
that they are free to ignore national priorities, nor is significant federal
direction of local police new. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal
government launched a series of initiatives – usually through grants – to
gain state and local law enforcement agencies’ support in waging the wars
on crime and drugs. For instance, the Local Law Enforcement Assistance
(LLEA) program provided federal money to states in support of narcotics
enforcement efforts, and the Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) program provided federal money directly to municipal police
70
departments to support violent-criminal enforcement efforts.
The result has been a delicate balance for police agencies between local
autonomy and participation in a broader federal system and constraint by
law. As Herman Goldstein explains:
The police should not be responsive in an unlimited sense to either
the entire community or minority interests in the community. In
many situations it is essential that the police act independent of
local community interests, responding instead to state or federal
laws that preempt local legislation and override local preferences.
It is precisely because we require a system that will insulate the
police from some pressures while subjecting them to others that the

68. See id.
69. See BREWER ET AL, supra note 66, at 115; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 10, at 51.
70. In March 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced the revitalization of the
Office of COPS and a $1 billion COPS Hiring Recovery Program, through which the
Department of Justice would provide funding directly to local law enforcement agencies to
hire new law enforcement officers. Holder stated that this program was needed in part
because “our cities are, in a very real sense, on the front lines in our fight against terrorism.”
Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric Holder
at the National League of Cities Conference, Mar. 16, 2009, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090316.html.
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task of achieving a proper form of citizen control over the police is
71
so complex.
Like the organizational challenges discussed above, accountability
challenges are neither new nor unique to the national security context. They
are, however, magnified in the context of combating terrorism.
One distinction between the many prior federal grant programs and
recent federal initiatives to enlist local support in defending against national
security threats is that the former involved “federalizing” spheres of activity
traditionally controlled by the states (crime), whereas the latter involve
“localizing” traditional federal spheres (national security). The very term
“national security” seems in some sense inconsistent with a police system
built upon strong traditions of localism. Yet any time national security
threats emanate from within U.S. borders – but especially as globalization
of travel and communications expands – events in any local area may have
national or international security repercussions.
One might think of the supply of police functions in market terms.
Control over police priorities and conduct by the local community –
through police leadership elections or appointments by elected officials and
through scrutiny by the local press – helps ensure that supply of police
72
services is responsive to community demand. A key issue is then whether
federal government influence on that prioritization of police activities in
support of national objectives is market-correcting or market-distorting.
Federal government intervention may be needed – but may also be
viewed as distorting – because unlike most (though not all) crime
prevention, the costs of combating terrorism are often borne locally while
the benefits accrue elsewhere or are not even observable. In the case of
most ordinary crime, the harm of the outlawed activity is felt by the
community in which it takes place, as is the impact of combating crime,
73
thereby allowing the community to weigh those costs and benefits.
Terrorist activities, however, are usually dispersed, and the ultimate
attacks may occur far away from the site of their planning – perhaps not
74
even in the same country. The costs of combating terrorism – resource
costs and trade-offs, intrusions on privacy or inconveniences of security
75
precautions – are nonetheless felt locally.

71. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 143.
72. This is not to say that this system always works well and produces effective and
legitimate outcomes. For a critical analysis of community policing and democratic
accountability, see Sklansky, supra note 67, at 1810-1814.
73. See Wilson, supra note 9.
74. David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635,
637-638 (2005). To be clear, this issue is not entirely unique to terrorism or national
security threats. It also applies, for example, to narcotics activities and organized crime.
75. See id.
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Even when perceived threats to national security arise, citizens will still
demand from their local police the same public safety and services to which
76
the community is accustomed. There is a limit, therefore, to the resources
or mission trade-offs that local agencies can devote to national security
functions. The federal government, by contrast, will be held accountable
for security lapses wherever they occur, by nature of its constitutional
primacy in national security affairs and corresponding public expectations.
At the same time, federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI
have the luxury of some discretion and electivity in their policing priorities.
They can move agents from fighting other crimes to concentrating on
counterterrorism, for example, more readily than local agencies can because
after September 11, public expectations are more focused on federal law
enforcement’s national security roles and because federal agencies are more
77
insulated from short-term electoral accountability.
In general, this means that federal coordination efforts and offers of
assistance to state and local agencies can alter local police priorities from
what the local political “market” might produce, but only to a point. A key
question is what happens when federal national security priorities are too
greatly misaligned from local political preferences.
Some of the consequences of misalignment are illustrated in two
frequently cited examples of local-federal tension in combating terrorism:
Detroit’s response to federal requests to interview certain immigrants, and
Portland, Oregon’s withdrawal from the FBI’s regional JTTF.
In November 2001, the Justice Department requested that local police
departments assist in interviewing 5,000 foreign men of Middle Eastern
origin residing in their communities to determine whether any of them
posed a terrorist threat or had useful information about possible terrorists.
The Detroit Police Chief and local officials worried that these interviews
might violate of state law and could alienate Arab-Americans. They
78
therefore refused to participate in the federal initiative.
In 2005, Portland became the first city to remove its law enforcement
agencies from the FBI-led JTTF. Key members of the city government
worried that the JTTF’s surveillance activities might, while complying with
federal law, not meet more stringent state law standards despite FBI
assurances. Nor, due to secrecy rules, could city government leaders

76. Ellen Scrivner, The Impact of September 11th on Community Policing, in
COMMUNITY POLICING: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 183, 187 (Lorie Fridell & Mary
Ann Wycoff eds., 2004).
77. Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34
CRIME & JUST. 377, 407-426 (2006).
78. Fox Butterfield, Police Are Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2001, at A1; Tamara Audi & David Zeman, Many Face a Grilling: Antiterror
Questions Disclosed, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 23, 2001.
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oversee whether city police officers participating in the JTTF were abiding
79
by agreed-upon guidelines.
In both Detroit and Portland, pressures stemming from local
accountability systems forced municipal agencies to opt out of the federal
80
effort. The Detroit greater metropolitan area is home to an especially
large Arab-American community. Arab-American leaders voiced concern
about the interview initiative, and the local police had worked hard over
recent years to build a relationship of trust with the Arab-American
community, a relationship the police feared could fray as a result of heavy81
handed federal efforts. Portland, is an area known for its generally liberal
orientation (in 2003 the city council publicly criticized and called for major
changes in the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted by Congress soon after
September 11 to expand domestic law enforcement and intelligence
powers), and city officials were probably particularly sensitive about
aggressive federal counterterrorism efforts after a Portland-area lawyer and
convert to Islam was erroneously linked by the FBI to terrorist bombings in
82
Madrid.
These examples are best seen as extremes rather than as illustrations of
the norm. Most local police agencies have cooperated with federal efforts
in large measure. However, these counter-examples are important to show
what happens when national security policing initiatives get too far out of
step with local political constraints. One may infer that many other local
83
communities and institutions will also resist, even if in less radical ways.
An important debate centers on whether local accountability systems can
withstand federal pressure and influence.
Daniel Richman argues that over time the political process through
which federal, state, and local governments negotiate cooperation in joint
efforts may promote both accountability and effectiveness in combating
84
terrorism. That national security efforts, led principally by the federal

79. Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism,
and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941, 952-955 (2005); Anna Griffin & Scott
Learn, Portland Opts Out of Anti-Terror Task Force, OREGONIAN, Apr. 23, 2005.
80. On state and local resistance to carrying out federal antiterrorism immigration
policies, see Harris, supra note 27, at 21-44.
81. See Shannon McCaffrey, New FBI Sweep Worries Muslims, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
May 27, 2004; Tamara Audi, Terror War Hits Home, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 12, 2002;
Siobhan Gorman, Detroit Finds Some Answers, NAT’L J., Mar. 29, 2003, at 998.
82. See Tomas Alex Tizon, Portland, FBI Unit to Part Ways, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2005, at A6.
83. Empirical evidence continues to bear this out. “A growing number of state and
local governments have protested the federal government’s surveillance and intelligencegathering in antiterrorism investigations. As of February 13, 2006, a total of eight state
legislatures and 397 local governments have passed resolutions objecting to federal
investigative practices.” Tom Lininger, Federalism and Antiterrorism Investigations, 17
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 391, 391 (2006).
84. See Richman, supra note 77.
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government, depend on local agencies gives those local agencies leverage.
Their accountability, through both electoral politics and the need to
maintain cooperative relationships with the communities they serve, in turn
may help tether the combined local-state-federal government to responsible
and effective policies.
William Stuntz offers a less sanguine view. He views the threat of
terrorism as likely to loosen restraints on coercive federal police powers,
85
which will likely loosen restraints on police powers at the local level.
Corey Robin similarly points to the history of police excesses in the 1950s
and 1960s in warning that “[t]he danger of cooperation between federal
agencies and local police is not that the former will conscript the latter into
repressive programs the latter would not otherwise pursue, but that it allows
the police to apply the legitimizing gloss of national security to their own
86
pet projects of repression.”
As Richman points out, the notion of local police governance serving as
a brake to local-federal cooperation on overly aggressive federal tendencies
is ironic, given the past tendencies to view federal oversight as necessary to
87
rein in abusive state and local practices rather than the reverse. Indeed,
much of modern constitutional criminal procedure doctrine grew out of
federal clampdowns on abuses at the state and local levels (often tinged
88
with institutional racism).
In the end, the degree to which federally led national security initiatives
distort – for better or for worse – local accountability systems, or the extent
to which those local accountability systems shape broader national security
policy will probably vary from locality to locality, depending on many of
the factors cited earlier,
including size, ethnic composition, and
dependence on federal assistance.
This push and pull dynamic involving federal and local pressures is
hardly unique to policing. There is often, however, an added complication
in the national security realm because many policing activities aimed at
combating terrorism or other national security threats are necessarily secret
89
or opaque to the public. The ability to track crime rates and to compare
them across both localities and time helps hold local police and other law
enforcement agencies accountable for performance, at least with regard to
their main law and order functions. The public can gauge performance and
90
express satisfaction or dissatisfaction through the political process. But
secret surveillance practices – such as the use of undercover informants or

85. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137
(2002); Herman, supra note 79, at 968.
86. See Corey Robin, History’s Shadow, BOSTON REV., Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 20.
87. See Richman, supra note 77, at 421.
88. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 201-206.
89. See Ross, supra note 33.
90. See Richman, supra note 77, at 378.
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Even if such
remote monitoring – are designed to be undetectable.
surveillance is generally believed to be occurring, its impact on security or
92
liberty is difficult to observe or measure.
This secrecy challenge for accountability is not new, and it exists at all
levels of government. But a robust system of formal and informal checks
on secretive state activity generally operates differently – and in some cases
93
more strongly – at the federal level than at the local level. It may seem
counterintuitive to worry more about the adequacy of checks at the state
and local level, because federal agencies command such vast intrusive
capabilities and have historically abused them. But that history of
problems, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, led to the creation of formal
mechanisms and institutions at the federal level to regulate domestic spying
by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Following the Church and Pike Committee investigations in the 1970s,
Congress enacted legislation, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), and created permanent congressional intelligence oversight
committees and intelligence agency inspectors general. Internal federal
regulations and guidelines constructed a “wall” separating intelligence and
94
law enforcement bureaucracies and the information they collected. The
abuses of the 1960s and 1970s led also to constraints on domestic spying at
the state and local levels, including the enactment of state laws restricting
surveillance of political and other group activities as well as consent
95
decrees stemming from lawsuits challenging police monitoring.
Since September 11, many of these post-Watergate reforms have been
rolled back. At the federal level, for example, the USA PATRIOT Act and
administrative reforms have expanded law enforcement agencies’ authority
to collect intelligence domestically and to share that information with other
96
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. At state and local levels, too,
some governments have sought to expand their surveillance authority,
97
98
including through legislative reform and revisions to consent decrees.
91. Criminal law enforcement also uses these tools, but in that context they are heavily
and publicly regulated, and the general policies of their use – even if not specific instances –
are openly known.
92. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58
ALA. L. REV. 811, 829-831 (2007).
93. For a general discussion of these issues as they relate to federal intelligence
activities, see JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES 126-159 (2007).
94. See id. at 78-86; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 78-79.
95. See Paul G. Chevigny, Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1984).
96. See William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2007).
97. See Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic
Surveillance After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 977 (2003) (“Not surprisingly, we
have found that much of the post-September 11 legislation liberalizes, or proposes to
liberalize, the state wiretap and other electronic surveillance laws.”).
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At the federal level, however, there generally remain multiple layers of
checks on the conduct of police and intelligence agencies, and perceived
excesses by the Bush administration have intensified that scrutiny,
99
including that by the courts. Congressional committees and the Justice
Department’s inspector general’s office actively oversee the FBI’s activities
and have debated fiercely further amendments to domestic intelligence
100
laws.
Beyond government institutional safeguards, scrutiny by civil
liberties groups and investigative journalists provide further checks on
101
executive discretion, including through litigation.
Of course there are exceptions and reasons that in some cases scrutiny
102
may be more robust at the state and local levels than at the federal level.
For example, state and local governments lack formal authorities for
designating and maintaining classified information such as those the federal
103
government uses, which help keep information from the public domain.
Other mechanisms for promoting local police compliance with
constitutional and other legal rules include criminal and civil liability,
104
internal inspections, and citizen oversight boards.
One important
question, though, is whether at the state and local levels there are sufficient
checks on secret activities, because some layers of inter-branch or nongovernmental monitoring are likely to be weaker and less formalized at
105
state and local levels, or in some locales, than at the federal level. At the
98. See Jerrold L. Steigman, Reversing Reform: The Handschu Settlement in PostSeptember 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 745 (2003).
99. See Editorial, A Better Surveillance Law, WASH. POST, June 20, 2008, at A18.
100. On FBI Reforms Following an Inspector General’s Report Critical of the Way the
FBI Handled “National Security Letters,” see Oversight Results: The FBI Tightens Its
Procedures for Using National Security Letters, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2008, at A18.
101. For an illustration of these checks at work, see Eric Lichtblau, New Guidelines
Would Give F.B.I. Broader Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at A20. See also RICHARD
GID POWERS, BROKEN: THE TROUBLED PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FBI 1-27, 428439 (2004) (describing how these ch ecks operate on the FBI).
102. For the example of Maryland state efforts to legislate against police surveillance,
see Julie Bykowicz, State Lawmakers Propose Anti-Spying Legislation, BALTIMORE SUN,
Jan. 23, 2009; see also Lisa Rein, Federal Agency Aided Md. Spying, WASH. POST, Feb. 17,
2009, at B1 (reporting complaints and inquiries by civil liberties groups and public officials).
103. President Obama has initiated a review of the federal government’s classification
policies. See Philip Elliott, Obama Wants Classified Information Review, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 27, 2009. Of course, regardless of formal authorities and requirements, state
and local police are accustomed to keeping secret operational information.
104. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL , supra note 10, at 275-290.
105. See RILEY & HOFFMAN , supra note 15, ch. 4.
Oversight of state and local intelligence activities is mostly ad hoc and informal. It
is generally conducted through the LLEA’s chain of command, although some
departments have “outside” review bodies, such as the LAPD’s civilian committee
approving undercover operations. The courts have not been active in overseeing
state and local activities. That may be in large part because most intelligence
gathering – especially that not predicated on a crime having been committed – is
done by federal officials through federal authorizations.
Id. at 49.
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very least, it is likely that oversight will remain highly uneven across
different states and localities, depending on variation in institutional
mechanisms, civic culture, and the strength of local watchdog and advocacy
106
groups or branches.
While state and local agencies lack the resources and technical
capabilities of the federal government (as well as the intensity of national
security political pressures), there are other reasons to be especially vigilant
concerning national security-driven infringements of civil liberties at the
local level. Because local police, unlike the FBI, have a broader law and
order and public service mandate, their routine activities tend to penetrate
more widely and deeply into community groups, including civic and
religious organizations. Indeed, this is one of the features that make local
police potentially valuable from a counterterrorism perspective.
Consider, for example, a law enforcement officer visiting a local
mosque believed to provide a forum for the preaching of extremism.
Putting aside how the local law or internal regulations regulate surveillance
of groups, a local uniformed police officer’s visit to that mosque and
interaction with its congregation might stir fewer anxieties among its
107
members than a visit by an FBI agent.
Police are supposed to interact
with significant community groups and to understand the relationships
within the community, while FBI agents historically were not expected to.
In some cases, this may be a benign police-community relationship from a
civil liberties standpoint; in other cases it may open the door to abuses.
IV. FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES
The example of conducting interviews of those attending a mosque
highlights another set of challenges for local police in handling national
security mandates – there is tension between intelligence functions and
other police functions. The Detroit Police Department’s resistance to
federal immigration enforcement and investigation efforts discussed above
108
reflected not only the political independence of states and localities, but
also the practical difficulties of effectively carrying out traditional policing

106. See Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 66 (2004) (describing the dearth of empirical research regarding
effectiveness of various approaches to promoting police compliance with law and
department policies).
107. See, e.g., Scott Glover, Informant Describes Work for FBI, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2009, at 3 (describing Muslim organizations’ concerns about FBI surveillance efforts
targeting mosque members); Samantha Henry, Some Muslims Rethink Close Ties to Law
Enforcement, MIAMI HERALD, May 4, 2009 (describing backlash by Muslim communities
against perceived FBI infiltration of mosques); H. G. Reza, New Fears in Muslim
Community Follow Reports of U.S. Monitoring, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at 3 (describing
suspicion among American Muslim communities about federal spying).
108. See supra notes 67-70, and accompanying text.
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missions while simultaneously collecting national security information
109
concerning community groups and their members.
This is more than simply an issue of constrained resources and
110
Rather,
allocation trade-offs (although, of course, those are involved).
this is about whether and how pursuit of national security missions can
undermine other law enforcement and community safety functions.
There are two main difficulties. The first is the general and longstanding tension between criminal law enforcement and intelligence
collection. Law enforcement agencies typically strive for convictions of
lawbreakers, while intelligence agencies attempt to collect information
111
about them. Law enforcement involves taking individuals off the street;
112
intelligence agencies may depend on keeping them on the street. Often,
of course, the objectives align, but not always.
113
While this tension has been studied mostly at the federal level, it also
complicates the organizational challenges mentioned earlier. Local police
agencies may be more likely to prize efforts to rid their streets of dangerous
individuals even if doing so is at the expense of developing clear pictures of
national or international networks, a federal priority.
Consider, for example, the varying priorities a local police agency and
the FBI might have when it comes to arresting an individual suspected of
trafficking in bomb-making materials. The local police agency might want
to arrest this individual as soon as possible and in a high-profile way. By
contrast, the FBI (with responsibility for federal crimes as well as domestic
intelligence) might not want to disrupt his activities immediately or at all,
but rather would prefer instead to build a larger case against his affiliates in
114
other jurisdictions or to collect intelligence on a broader network.

109. See Harris, supra note 27, at 37-44.
110. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19.
111. See William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance
After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1150-1153 (2003).
112. See RICHARD POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS
109-118 (2007); Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 425-436 (2007) (arguing that
after 9/11, the Justice Department tended to favor early intervention in terrorism cases).
This tension between law enforcement and intelligence priorities was evident in the case of
the “Lackawanna Six,” mentioned earlier, see Dina Temple-Raston, Enemy Within? Not
Quite, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2007, at B1, though internal FBI reforms and other federal
revamping (such as creation of the National Counterterrorism Center) have helped alleviate
some of this tension.
113. See, e.g., Gregory F. Treverton, Set up To Fail, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, 64 (2002),
available at http://www.govexec.com/features/0902/0902s6.htm.
114. See RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at xiv-xv (“Federal authorities – the FBI
in particular – will naturally lead in intelligence gathering that is not connected to criminal
investigation. Local [law enforcement agencies] have neither money nor capacity for that
kind of pure intelligence.”); Scott Shane & Lowell Bergman, F.B.I. Struggling To Reinvent
Itself To Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006.
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How should these concerns be reconciled and prioritized? The JTTFs
provide a mechanism for adjudicating bureaucratic differences – and
ultimately the prosecutions of terrorism crimes will usually take place at the
federal level – but they do not set the underlying policy priorities, which
need to be worked out through the political process.
Besides the general tension between law enforcement and intelligence
functions, a further tension concerns balancing counterterrorism activities
with the particular law and order activities of local police agencies,
especially where aggressive counterterrorism may undermine cooperative
relationships with community actors.
As noted earlier, current trends in community policing and problemoriented policing demand wider and deeper police engagement within the
community, including cooperative partnerships with community
organizations and leaders to reduce crime, enhance security, and tackle the
115
problems that underlie criminal patterns. These approaches often include
involving key community groups or representatives in decision making as
part of a broader effort to improve responsiveness to community needs and
116
establish sustained relationships of trust.
Some see this trend as creating natural synergies with national security
117
functions.
Gary LaFree and James Hendrickson of the University of
Maryland write: “In many ways the community-oriented approach favored
by successful police departments is the same kind of approach that is most
118
likely to uncover terrorist operations.”
Local familiarity provides a
baseline for detecting suspicious activities, and local police may have
networks of cooperative relationships with community members who
119
supply them with information.
According to George L. Kelling and
William J. Bratton, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (which
commands the second largest U.S. municipal counterterrorism police force,
behind New York): “Local police officers have an everyday presence in the
communities that they are sworn to protect. They ‘walk the beat,’
communicate regularly with local residents and business owners, and are
more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighborhoods that they
120
patrol.” As a result, local police “are in a better position to know

115. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 85-93. There remains a good
deal of controversy over how effective these strategies are, especially with respect to police
compliance with law and department policies and to perceived legitimacy among
communities. See id. at 328-329 (calling for more research in these areas).
116. See Harris, supra note 27, at 21-44.
117. See Darrel W. Stephens & Francis X. Hartmann, The Policing Challenge, in
BEYOND THE BELTWAY: FOCUSING ON HOMETOWN SECURITY 15, 15-22 (2002).
118. Gary LaFree & James Hendrickson, Build a Criminal Justice Policy for Terrorism,
6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2007).
119. See Sageman, supra note 43, at 223, 229-231.
120. Kelling & Bratton, supra note 29, at 2.
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responsible leaders in the Islamic and Arabic communities and can reach
121
out to them for information or for help in developing informants.”
Ellen Scrivner, the former Deputy Director for Community Policing
Development in the Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented
122
Policing Services, offers a more cautious assessment. She suggests that
some of the local police agency enthusiasm for taking on counterterrorism
functions may reflect the pursuit of new financial and other resources and
may come at the expense of traditional local police functions:
During the 1990s, law enforcement leaders helped to determine
how resources should be directed to continue the fight against
crime, and they had a strong voice at the federal funding table.
Now they struggle to find where the table is located . . . .
Consequently, police leaders question whether law enforcement
interests will be fully represented in what is now a competition for
resources. These events cannot help but influence the future of
community policing as local agencies modify operations to position
123
their agencies to receive homeland security funds.
Some of this concern is based on the fear that resource-tradeoffs will
124
cause counterterrorism activities to squeeze out other police functions.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that aggressive counterterrorism policies
by law enforcement agencies may disrupt other valuable policing
efforts. In particular, perceptions that police are “spying” may undermine
125
the relationships of trust so critical to community policing strategies. The
Los Angeles Police Department recently touted its program for ensuring
that tips about potential terrorist activity are passed from patrolling officers
to federal security officials, but it then had to shelve a program intended to
reach out to Muslim communities because it was perceived as an effort to
126
monitor them. The urgency of taking short-term aggressive police action
to uncover or disrupt terrorist plots may also erode goodwill cultivated
127
through long-term police efforts to provide community services.

121. Id.
122. See Scrivner, supra note 76.
123. Id. at 188.
124. See David Johnston, With Crime up, a City’s Police Force Questions the Focus on
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2008, at A17; Eric Schmitt & David Johnston, States Chafing
at U.S. Focus on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at A1; see also RILEY & HOFFMAN,
supra note 15, at 47 (“Unfortunately, there is no analysis on the tradeoff between homeland
security and crime prevention activities, so no conclusions can be drawn about the effect that
post–9/11 missions are having on crime.”).
125. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
126. See Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at 1; Siobhan Gorman, LAPD Terror-Tip Plan May Serve as
Model, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2008, at A3.
127. See Harris, supra note 27, at 39-44.
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These functional tensions are likely to be exacerbated across federallocal jurisdictional and bureaucratic lines, because federal law enforcement
agencies generally do not have to balance local law and order with their
national security priorities, have less direct interest in long-term
relationships with community figures and groups, and are not directly
128
accountable to them politically. A study sponsored by the Justice
Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services reported
concerns among local police that federal agents “are not aware of
community issues when they sweep into a jurisdiction to search for an
individual or engage in other investigatory practices and leave just as
quickly. The unintended consequence is damage to police-citizen relations,
particularly in minority communities, that took tremendous effort to build
129
through community policing.”
If Daniel Richman is correct, in suggesting that “the federal
government [may] court the assistance of state and local governments by
giving them a greater voice in how the federal government interacts with
130
citizens, and particularly with immigrant communities,” we can expect
some of these functional tensions to work themselves out through federallocal political and bureaucratic dynamics. David Thacher studied the
handling of the Justice Department’s immigrant interview requests by the
police department in Dearborn, Michigan, near Detroit, a city that contains
a high concentration of Arab-Americans. He found that:
Concerns about community trust did seem to influence the way the
city participated in the interviews, despite the police’s own
inclination to view the effort as a legitimate law enforcement tool.
Local police declined to conduct the interviews themselves, they
went to great lengths to explain their participation in a qualified
way, and they ultimately adopted the role (at least in part) of
monitors for the federal agents and representatives of community
131
concerns.
Thacher concludes:
In that way, the role the [Dearborn Police Department] played in
the Justice Department interviews was shaped by the interest local
police had in establishing legitimate boundaries around the use of
new surveillance and information-gathering efforts, which could

128.
129.

See id.
See GERARD R. MURPHY & MARTHA R. PLOTKIN, 1 PROTECTING YOUR
COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 12
(2003), available at http://www.policeforum.org/terrorismwp.html.
130. See Richman, supra note 77, at 418.
131. Thacher, supra note 74, at 661.
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otherwise undermine the trust and support they had worked so hard
132
to develop in the Arab community.
It is difficult to generalize from cases such as this. At the federal level,
too, the FBI and other agencies and departments have taken steps to reach
out to Arab-American and Muslim-American communities, perhaps partly
133
The
as a result of interactions with local law enforcement agencies.
degree to which any gap between counterterrorism functions and successful
local policing approaches can be narrowed in the long term will depend
heavily on whether local policing is seen by security officials at all levels as
effective in guaranteeing both local and national security.
Looking at the British experience, Martin Innes concludes: “Based
upon providing local communities with a degree of direct democratic
influence over how they are policed, [neighborhood policing] officers will
be well positioned to build levels of interpersonal trust with members of
Muslim and other minority communities upon which the communication of
134
intelligence is often contingent.”
In addition to addressing the
improvement of counterterrorism effectiveness without the sacrifice of
other police missions, Innes concludes that this model helps safeguard civil
liberties, too: “[Integrating neighborhood policing into counterterrorism
efforts] may be more effective and ultimately less damaging to democratic
traditions than extending covert policing methods and the sorts of
reactionary legislative reform proposals that governments tend to issue in
135
the wake of major terrorist incidents.”
This view heavily influences
counterterrorism strategies in the United Kingdom, learned not only from
dealing with contemporary Islamist terrorism but with Britain’s extended
136
experience in combating terrorism in Northern Ireland.
Will a similar view take hold in the United States? Perhaps, but, as
discussed below, even if it would be desirable, any similar adaptation in the
U.S. system will likely be slow and nonlinear due to the institutional
fragmentation and decentralization of the American policing system.

132. Id. at 661-662.
133. See Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Reinforce
Commitment To Working with Leaders of Muslim, Sikh and Arab-American Communities,
July 9, 2004; Alexandra Marks, US Works to Bridge Its Muslim Trust Gap, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 27, 2006, at 1; see also Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, Remarks at the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee’s Silver
Anniversary National Convention, May 28, 2005 (discussing steps by DHS), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0627.shtm.
134. Martin Innes, Policing Uncertainty Countering Terror Through Community
Intelligence and Democratic Policing, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 222, 224
(2006).
135. Id.
136. See DAVID BLAKEY, HER MAJESTY’S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY, A NEED
TO KNOW: HMIC THEMATIC INSPECTION OF SPECIAL BRANCH AND PORTS POLICING (2003),
available at http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/antk/them03antk.pdf.
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V. FUTURE PATHS
The legal and institutional challenges discussed above stem from the
localized and heterogeneous nature of the U.S. local policing system. One
possible future involves radical structural reform that would address these
issues through new federal institutions to coordinate efforts nationally and
relieve local police systems of major responsibilities. At the other end of
the spectrum, decentralized localization of American policing might not
only prove resilient, but could gain new strength from the national security
law challenges discussed above.
As for radical structural change, some experts after the September 2001
attacks called for creating a domestic intelligence agency like the United
Kingdom’s MI5 to relieve local police of much of its national security
137
mission. Creating new federal institutions, so the argument goes, might
also alleviate tension within the FBI between its law enforcement and its
intelligence functions, and it might even address some civil liberties
concerns by separating the most intrusive surveillance authorities from
138
institutions that wield other coercive powers, such as authority to arrest.
Such architectural revamping – even if it could address the fundamental
decentralization problem – is extremely unlikely, however. Serious
proposals of this sort have waned in recent years, as 2001 has become more
139
distant. The political convulsions following the 9/11 attacks produced a
series of macro-level architectural reforms and decisions, including
assignment of domestic counterterrorism intelligence collection to the FBI,
reorganization of the intelligence community under a new Director of
National Intelligence, and creation of the Department of Homeland
140
Security, which consolidating dozens of smaller agencies. Even putting
aside the civil liberties outcry that would follow any proposal to create a
dedicated domestic intelligence service, it seems unlikely that additional
organizational overhauls will follow in the near future absent a dramatic
escalation in threat.
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The process of further organizational reform in the foreseeable future is
therefore likely to be evolutionary, not revolutionary. The challenges
outlined above will be addressed incrementally.
Drawing broad
conclusions about how these challenges will be resolved, however, is
complicated by two factors.
First, the very structure of American policing that makes these
questions so critical – decentralized and heterogeneous – makes it arduous
but necessary to study these national security institutional challenges
empirically in a thorough way. American policing at all levels has been
well studied, but much of what we know about recent experience with
national security coordination, accountability, and tensions with other
police functions is based more on anecdotal evidence than on the type
comprehensive investigation that will support the needed analytical depth.
For example, the point raised in Part IV about different checks operating on
some national security powers at the federal level compared to state and
local levels warrants further study. Future studies might help explain why
there is – or why there should be – differentiation between national security
functions of local and national agencies.
141
Second, the national security threat itself is evolving. There is a
growing debate within the academic and intelligence communities about
whether the primary terrorism threat to the United States comes from
abroad by centrally organized and controlled groups like al Qaeda, or is
home-grown in the United States from loosely knit cells of individuals
142
becoming radicalized largely on their own.
According to terrorism
researcher Marc Sageman (who has worked as an advisor to the NYPD):
The present threat has evolved from a structured group of al Qaeda
masterminds, controlling vast resources and issuing commands, to a
multitude of informal local groups trying to emulate their
predecessors by conceiving and executing operations from the
bottom up. These “homegrown” wannabes form a scattered global
143
network, a leaderless jihad.
Other scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, dispute Sageman’s assessment, and
argue instead that al Qaeda and its allies operating abroad remain strong and
144
continue to constitute the major terrorism threat facing the United States.

141. For a recent congressional report highlighting the homegrown terrorist threat, see
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files/IslamistReport.pdf.
142. See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2008).
143. Id. at vii.
144. See Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 133
(2008).
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The U.S. intelligence community, meanwhile, maintains that al Qaeda and its
allies continue to threaten the United States, while also predicting that
145
autonomous terrorist cells will likely develop inside the United States.
Over the long term, responsibility for dealing with “top down” threats like
al Qaeda will fall mostly on the federal government, which must penetrate and
disrupt the network at home and abroad. Responsibility for dealing with a
“bottom up” threat like autonomous terrorist cells, by contrast, will continue to
146
be shared heavily with local police agencies. According to Brian Michael
Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, “As [terrorism] metastasizes, cops are it.
147
This would exacerbate the
We’re going to win this at the local level.”
challenges outlined above. Analyzing and designing institutions to address the
organizational, accountability, and functional issues described above thus
requires more precise efforts to match institutional solutions to sophisticated
assessments of threat.
CONCLUSION
This article raises and begins to answer three key questions about the
decentralized and heterogeneous system of U.S. policing and national
security. Is greater networking of local, state, and federal police agencies
an effective way to combat terrorism? Will devolution of national security
responsibilities to local police agencies disrupt systems of accountability
and oversight? Will national security responsibilities undermine traditional
core functions of local policing?
The decentralization and heterogeneity of U.S. policing pose obstacles
to effective national coordination efforts and sometimes serve to check
intrusive federal powers and policies while also raising concerns about
over-intrusion at the local level. Due to the vast diversity of U.S.
communities and the police institutions that serve them, the equilibrium of
national security law will reemerge, depending in part on the changing
nature of the terrorism threat, in decentralized ways as well.

145. See BLAIR, supra note 25, at 4-8.
146. See Sageman, supra note 43, at 230-231.
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NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005, at 58, 61 (quoting Jenkins).

